Introduces the question around which this module is organised. Getting a pre-theoretical handle on joint action is best done by contrasting joint actions with actions that are merely individual but occur in parallel. The method of contrast cases is familiar from Pears , who used contrast cases to argue that whether something is an ordinary, individual action depends on its antecedents. The Simple View is an answer to the question, What distinguishes genuine joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?
But does invoking acting together make this idea circular? According to the Circularity Objection, the Simple View fails to adequately answer to the question, What distinguishes genuine joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?
Here we consider a deeper reply to the Circularity Objection. Apparently the Simple View cannot distinguish between all the contrast cases that an account of shared agency must distinguish. Contrast cases are pairs of cases where one involves shared agency and the other does not and which are otherwise as similar as possible. Most philosophers agree that a notion of shared intention is needed to characterise shared agency. The idea is that shared intention stands to joint action as ordinary, individual intention stands to ordinary, individual action.
But what is shared intention? On most accounts, shared intentions are neither shared nor intentions. But why not take the term literally? Intentions can be shared in the sense in which Ayesha and her best friend share a name.
This would yield a version of the Simple View. Or perhaps they can be shared in the sense in which Ayesha and her brother share a mother. Bratman shared-intention. The leading, best developed account of shared intention is due to Michael Bratman. What are the main features of his account? Bratman shared-intention simple-view. These are also objections to the Simple View.
